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ABSTRACT: As an introduction to the special issue on Perspectives on Strategic
Maneuvering, this article provides a synthetic recapitulation of the various steps that were
taken in developing the pragma-dialectical theory of strategic maneuvering. First, the
concept of strategic maneuvering is described as a means to reconcile the simultaneous
pursuit of dialectical and rhetorical aims. Second, strategic maneuvering is related to the
various kinds of argumentative activity types in which it takes place. Third, the concept of
dialectical proﬁles is discussed and the parameters that are pertinent to distinguishing
between diﬀerent types of strategic maneuvering. Fourth, the fallacies are viewed as
derailment of strategic maneuvering. Fifth, as a case in point, strategic maneuvering with
inconsistency is examined.
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1. A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE
The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation developed by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) enables the analyst of
argumentative discourse to make a normative reconstruction of the
discourse that results in an analytic overview of all elements that are
pertinent to a critical evaluation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst,
1992). The analytic overview clariﬁes the diﬀerence of opinion at issue
and the positions of the participants. It identiﬁes the procedural and
substantive premises that serve as the starting point of the discussion.
It surveys the arguments and criticisms that are – explicitly or implic-
itly – advanced, the argument schemes that are used, the argumenta-
tion structures that are developed. And it determines the conclusion
that is reached. The analysis is in every respect based on the pragma-
dialectical model of a critical discussion that provides a survey of all
speech acts and combinations of speech acts that have a constructive
function in the various stages of the process of resolving a diﬀerence
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of opinion on the merits and therefore provides an appropriate heuristic
and analytic tool for reconstructing the resolution process. This recon-
struction amounts to making explicit speech acts that remain implicit in
the actual discourse but are relevant to the resolution process
(addition), reformulating speech acts whose function would otherwise
be opaque in an unequivocal way (substitution), rearranging speech
acts whose order does not reﬂect their function in the resolution process
in a more insightful way (permutation), and abandoning speech acts
from consideration that do not play a part in the resolution process
(deletion) (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs, 1993).
In certain cases, however, neither the textual presentation, nor con-
textual information in the strict sense or in the broad sense, nor gen-
eral or speciﬁc background knowledge seem to offer enough evidence
for a full reconstruction of the discourse, so that pragma-dialecticians
– in a charitable fashion – take refuge to so-called maximal strategies
aimed at making the analytic choices that do most justice to the pur-
poses of a critical discussion, but remain, in fact, arbitrary (maximal
dialectical analysis, maximal argumentative interpretation). This pre-
dicament makes the analysis that can be achieved less comprehensive
than desirable, its justiﬁcation less ﬁrmly grounded than desirable, and
an evaluation based on this analysis less thorough than desirable. In
our view, the reconstruction that takes place in a pragma-dialectical
analysis of argumentative discourse can be further reﬁned and better
accounted for if the standard version of the pragma-dialectical theory
is extended by including a rhetorical dimension that makes it possible
to take the strategic design of the discourse into consideration in the
analysis (cf. Leff, 2006). A pragma-dialectical theory that is thus
extended will, because the strategic function of argumentative moves is
taken into account, also allow for a more realistic treatment of the fal-
lacies in the evaluation of argumentative discourse (cf. Zarefsky,
2006). We therefore aimed for developing such an extended version of
the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation.
2. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING TO COMBINE PURSUING DIALECTICAL
AND RHETORICAL AIMS
For most scholars of argumentation there is a yawning conceptual and
communicative gap between a dialectical approach and a rhetorical
approach to the study of argumentation (cf. Leeman, 1992; Toulmin,
2001). This gap hinders the development of a full-ﬂedged theory of
argumentation and is, in our view, unnecessary (cf. Wenzel, 1990). We
want to bridge the gap by showing that rhetorical and dialectical
approaches are, in fact, complementary (cf. Krabbe, 2002; Leﬀ, 2002).
In pragma-dialectics dialectic is deﬁned pragmatically as a method for
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dealing systematically with critical exchanges in verbal communication
and interaction that amounts to the pragmatic application of logic, a
collaborative method of putting logic into use so as to move from
conjecture and opinion to more secure belief (van Eemeren et al.,
1996: 214). As far as it is pertinent to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric is the
theoretical study of the potential eﬀectiveness of argumentative dis-
course in convincing or persuading an audience in actual argumenta-
tive practice.1 Starting from these deﬁnitions, there is no reason to
assume that the rhetorical norm of artful persuasion is necessarily in
contradiction with the dialectical ideal of reasonableness. In practice,
argumentative moves that are considered rhetorically strong by a criti-
cal audience will almost certainly be in accordance with the dialectical
norms applying to the discussion stage concerned. Viewed from this
perspective, there is a sound basis for overcoming the traditional divi-
sion between dialectic and rhetoric.
In our view, the gap between dialectic and rhetoric can be bridged
by introducing the theoretical concept of strategic maneuvering (van
Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002). Strategic maneuvering refers to the ef-
forts arguers make in argumentative discourse to reconcile aiming for
rhetorical eﬀectiveness with maintaining dialectical standards of rea-
sonableness. Each of the four stages in the process of resolving a dif-
ference of opinion by means of a critical discussion is characterized by
having a speciﬁc dialectical objective. Because, as a matter of course,
the parties want to realize these objectives to the best advantage of the
position they have adopted, every dialectical objective has its rhetori-
cal analogue. In each discussion stage, the rhetorical goals of the par-
ticipants will be dependent on – and therefore run parallel with – their
dialectical goals. As a consequence, the speciﬁcation of the rhetorical
aims the participants in the discourse are presumed to have must take
place according to dialectical stage. This is the methodological reason
why the study of strategic maneuvering that we propose boils down to
a systematic integration of rhetorical insight in a dialectical – in our
case, pragma-dialectical – framework of analysis.2
Strategic maneuvering manifests itself in argumentative discourse in
the choices that are made from the topical potential available at a
certain stage in the discourse, in audience-directed framing of the
argumentative moves, and in the purposive use of presentational de-
vices. Although these three aspects of strategic maneuvering, which
run parallel with classical areas of interest – topics, audience orienta-
tion and stylistics –, can be distinguished analytically, in actual
argumentative practice they will usually work together (cf. Kauffeld,
2002; Tindale, 2004). We only say that a party exhibits a fully-ﬂedged
argumentative strategy if this partys strategic maneuvering in the
discourse consistently converges with respect to choosing from topical
STRATEGIC MANEUVERING: A SYNTHETIC RECAPITULATION 383
potential, adapting to audience demand, and utilizing presentational
devices. Argumentative strategies in our sense are methodical designs
of moves for inﬂuencing the result of a particular dialectical stage, and
the discussion as a whole, to a certain partys advantage that manifest
themselves at a certain stage of the discourse in a systematic, coordi-
nated and simultaneous exploitation of the available opportunities.
There are speciﬁc confrontation strategies, speciﬁc opening strategies,
speciﬁc argumentation strategies and speciﬁc concluding strategies.
3. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING IN DIFFERENT KINDS
OF ARGUMENTATIVE ACTIVITY TYPES
In practice, argumentative discourse takes place in different kinds of
activity types, which are to a greater or lesser degree institutionalized,
so that certain practices have become conventionalized. Unlike theo-
retical constructs such as a critical discussion and other ideal models
based on analytic considerations regarding the most pertinent presen-
tation of the constitutive parts of a problem-valid procedure for carry-
ing out a particular kind of discursive task, activity types and the
speech events that are associated with them can be identiﬁed on the
basis of careful empirical observation of argumentative practice. In the
various activity types that can be distinguished in argumentative prac-
tice the conventional preconditions for argumentative discourse differ
to some extent and these differences have an effect on the strategic
maneuvering that is allowed. For some prominent activity types, such
as adjudication, mediation, and negotiation, we will describe the
preconditions pertinent to the conduct of strategic maneuvering, and
draw a comparison between them, in order to show how strategic
maneuvering is affected by the opportunities and constraints of the
activity type in which it takes place.
Adjudication aims for the termination of a dispute by a third party
rather than the resolution of a difference of opinion by the parties
themselves. It is commonly understood as taking a dispute to a public
court, where a judge, after having heard both sides, will make a rea-
soned decision in favor of either one of the parties. The judge deter-
mines who is wrong and who is right according to a set of rules. Most
of these rules are tantamount to speciﬁcations of rules for critical
discussion aimed at promoting that the dispute be terminated in a
reasonable way. There are, for instance, special rules concerning
the division of the burden of proof, the data that can be considered
as a common starting point and the kinds of proof that count as
acceptable. In adjudication, the parties readjust their roles from trying
to persuade each other to trying to convince the adjudicator.
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Mediation, a second activity type, starts from a difference of opin-
ion that has led to a disagreement that the parties concerned cannot
resolve by themselves, so that they have to take refuge to a third party
that acts as a neutral facilitator of the discussion process and guides
the parties in their cooperative (and sometimes less than cooperative)
search for a solution. Unlike an adjudicator, the mediator does not
have the power to terminate the disagreement. Irrespective of whether
the disagreement concerns custody of the children of a divorced couple
or the price that has to be paid for the reparation of a car, the media-
tor aims at helping the parties come to an arrangement that is satisfac-
tory to both parties.
Negotiation is an activity type that starts from a conﬂict of interests
rather than merely a difference of opinion. Unlike in adjudication and
mediation, in negotiations the disputants are focussed on each other
rather than on a presumably neutral third party. Negotiations proto-
typically aim for a compromise. Usually, the compromise will consist
of the maximum amount of agreement that can be reached on the ba-
sis of the concessions that both parties are willing to make. A series of
interest-related interactive speech events have developed that are aimed
at reaching an outcome in which the interests of both sides in the
negotiation are met to an extent that is mutually acceptable.
Starting from a comparative inventory of conventional precondi-
tions for argumentative discourse in such activity types, we can show
for each activity type how these preconditions discipline the conduct
of strategic maneuvering. Using this approach, we can also provide a
more detailed analysis of the way in which strategic maneuvering is
disciplined by conventional preconditions in speciﬁc and sometimes
more complex activity types such as public debate. Public debate is a
multi-varied activity type that is particularly relevant from the perspec-
tive of argumentation theory, especially from the perspective of our
extended pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, because its institu-
tionalization, as far as it goes, is aimed precisely at conventionalizing
the conduct of argumentative discourse in a way that optimally serves
both dialectical and rhetorical purposes.
4. DIALECTICAL PROFILES AND TYPES OF STRATEGIC MANEUVERING
In analyzing the type of strategic maneuvering that is carried out, for
each category of strategic maneuvering the following parameters must
be considered:
(1) the results that can be achieved;
(2) the routes that can be taken to achieve these results;
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(3) the constraints of the institutional context;
(4) the mutual commitments deﬁning the argumentative situation.
In analyzing the strategic function of a particular case of maneuver-
ing we have to take into account, ﬁrst, which results can be achieved
by making the argumentative move that is made, so that it can be ex-
plained what kind of outcome may be aimed for by this kind of strate-
gic maneuvering. The spectrum of relevant options open to be ﬁlled
out in the analytic overview can be of help in this endeavor. Second,
we have to take into account which reasonable options are available
when making the argumentative move so that it can be explained what
route is taken by carrying out this particular kind of strategic maneu-
vering. The dialectical proﬁle for the moves that are analytically rele-
vant at this juncture in the discussion procedure can be of help in this
endeavor (cf. Walton and Krabbe, 1995). Third, we have to take into
account the institutional constraints of the argumentative discourse
that is carried out, so that it can be explained what the conventional
preconditions are that the strategic maneuvering must meet in this
type of discourse. An understanding of the kind of activity type in
which, or social background against which, the strategic maneuvering
takes place can be of help in this endeavor. Fourth, we have to take
into account what is the actual state of affairs in the discourse when
the strategic maneuvering takes place, so that it can be explained to
what situational demands exactly the strategic maneuvering must
respond. An understanding of the mutual commitment sets deﬁning
the argumentative situation can be of help in this endeavor. If these
four parameters are duly considered in analyzing the maneuvering
manifesting itself in the discourse at the point the analyst is focusing
on, it can be explained which strategic function a particular type of
maneuvering, characterized by a certain combination of topical choice,
audience orientation and presentational design, may fulﬁll.
These four parameters allow for taking account of a ﬁnite set of
considerations that are pertinent to determining the type of strategic
maneuvering that takes place in making a certain argumentative move
at a speciﬁc point in the discourse. When taken together, they consti-
tute a useful basis for analyzing the maneuvering in each of the four
categories of strategic maneuvering. As a matter of course, the analysis
starts from the way in which the strategic maneuvering manifests itself
in the discourse, i.e., in a particular choice that is made from the
available topical potential, a particular way in which the opportunities
for framing the addressees perspective are used, and a particular way
in which the presentational possibilities are exploited. Although in
strategic maneuvering these three aspects always go together, and are
intrinsically connected, in argumentative practice one particular aspect
is often more prominently manifested than the other aspects. The
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strategic maneuvering may, for instance, come primarily to the fore in
the topical choice that is made, say by an emphatic use of an argu-
ment from authority (ex autoritate), or in the way audience adaptation
is realized, say by emphatically adopting the other partys arguments
(conciliatio), or in the use of presentational techniques, say by an em-
phatic repetition of the standpoint (repetitio). This is why it is, in our
view, in principle recommendable to refer to the type of strategic
maneuvering at issue by naming its most conspicuous manifestation in
either of the three aspects: maneuvering by argument from authority,
maneuvering by conciliation, maneuvering by repetition, etc. Subse-
quently, the four parameters we discussed can be used to analyze the
speciﬁc strategic function a particular type of maneuvering at issue
may have in the case where it is used.
5. FALLACIES AS DERAILMENTS OF STRATEGIC MANEUVERING
Although in strategic maneuvering the pursuit of dialectical objectives
and the realization of rhetorical aims can go well together, this – of
course – does not automatically mean that in practice there is always a
perfect balance between pursuing the two objectives. If a party allows
its commitment to a critical exchange of argumentative moves to be
overruled by the aim of persuading the opponent, so that his moves
are no longer in agreement with the critical norms, we say that the
strategic maneuvering has got derailed. Such derailments occur when
a rule for critical discussion has been violated in the discourse. In that
case, realizing the rhetorical aim has gained the upper hand at the ex-
pense of achieving the dialectical objective. Because derailments of
strategic maneuvering always involve a violation of a rule for critical
discussion, they are on a par with the wrong moves in argumentative
discourse designated as fallacies. Viewed from this perspective, fallacies
are violations of critical discussion rules that come about as derail-
ments of strategic maneuvering.
This account of the fallacies as derailments of strategic maneuvering
explains why in practice it may, as a matter of course, not be immedi-
ately apparent to all concerned that a fallacy has been committed, so
that the fallacy can pass unnoticed: the fallacy will have sound coun-
terparts that are manifestations of the same type of strategic maneu-
vering. Jackson (1995) has pointed out that it is an assumption of
reasonableness that a party that maneuvers strategically will normally
uphold a commitment to the rules of critical discussion, so that a pre-
sumption of reasonableness is conferred on every discussion move,
also when a particular way of maneuvering is in fact fallacious. Echo-
ing the logical Standard Deﬁnition of a fallacy, which was introduced
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and criticized by Hamblin (1970), we might say – in post-Hamblin
pragma-dialectical terms – that fallacious strategic maneuvering seems
to comply with the critical discussion rules, but does not. Deviations
from the rules for critical discussion are often also hard to detect be-
cause none of the parties will be very keen on portraying themselves as
being unreasonable. To realize a purpose that is potentially at odds
with the observation of a particular discussion rule, rather than resort-
ing to completely diﬀerent means, they will therefore be inclined to
stick to the dialectical means for achieving their objective that are con-
sidered reasonable and stretch these means in such a way that they
can still realize their purpose (cf. Kienpointner, 2006).
The difference between manifestations of strategic maneuvering that
are legitimate and manifestations that are fallacious is that in the latter
case certain soundness conditions have not been met that, at that point
in the discourse, apply to the conduct of the type of strategic maneu-
vering concerned in the activity type and argumentative situation in
which it occurs. In principle, each type of strategic maneuvering has, as
it were, its own continuum of sound and fallacious acting and the
boundaries between the two are not in all cases crystal clear. More of-
ten than not, fallacy judgments are in the end contextual judgments
that depend on the speciﬁc circumstances of situated argumentative
acting. The criteria for determining whether or not a certain norm for
critical discussion has been violated may be dependent on the institu-
tional conventions of the argumentative activity type concerned regard-
ing how argumentative discourse is disciplined – in a law case, for
instance, different criteria may apply to appealing to an authority than
in a public debate, so that making an appeal to authority by referring
to a certain law code may be a perfectly legitimate move in completing
the argumentation stage whereas in a public debate making such an
appeal may not be an appropriate move to conclude the argument.
This predicament should, of course, not lead us to the general conclu-
sion that there are no clear norms for determining when the strategic
maneuvering has gone astray, but only to the conclusion that the way
in which the criteria for deciding whether a norm has been complied
with may vary to some extent from the one type of activity to the
other, leaving room for the possibility that the criteria are in the one
activity type more precisely articulated than in the other.
6. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING WITH INCONSISTENCY
As a case of disciplining argumentative conduct, we discuss the demar-
cation of non-fallacious and fallacious instances of a type of strategic
maneuvering that takes place in the opening stage of a critical
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discussion in which the one party attacks the other party by pointing
out a logical or pragmatic inconsistency between one of that partys
starting points and a starting point that party assumed on a different
occasion. Pointing out such an inconsistency can be a perfectly legiti-
mate – and even very strong – strategic maneuver, but it can also de-
rail and result in a tu quoque fallacy.
When considering inconsistencies between starting points we must
distinguish between two kinds of starting points: (explicit or implicit)
procedural starting points, and (explicit or implicit) material starting
points. Ideally, both kinds of starting points should be fully clear, so
that the parties involved in the discussion not only know how the discus-
sion is going to be conducted but also what propositions they can safely
bring to bear once the discussion has come oﬀ the ground. In order to
conduct a proper critical discussion, the parties must agree in the open-
ing stage about the division of the burden of proof, the discussion rules
and the propositions that may be used in the argumentation stage to de-
fend and challenge the standpoints at issue. In argumentative practice, in
certain institutional contexts agreement about particular procedural and
material starting points is presupposed. As far as procedural starting
points are concerned, this goes, for instance, for activity (sub)types such
as parliamentary debate; as far as material starting points are concerned,
admissions made by the accused in the interrogation preceding the ac-
tual trial in a Dutch criminal law case provide a clear example: they can
be used in court to establish conclusions weighing against or in favor of
the accused, as the case may be.
In informal activity types there are usually no explicit agreements as to
the material starting points. Generally, the parties use certain propositions
as their starting points without asking for the other partys consent, but
taking this consent, rightly or wrongly, for granted. All the same, there
are a lot of cases in which it is ﬁrst negotiated in a sub-discussion whether
or not particular propositions may serve as a common starting point.
Viewed dialectically, the parties are under no obligation to provide a rea-
son for not admitting a proposition as a common starting point (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004: Ch. 6). Viewed rhetorically, however, it
may be better if they do: it is generally regarded of no use to start a dis-
cussion with people who refuse to commit themselves to any common
starting point or, without giving any further explanation, to a speciﬁc
starting point. Giving reasons for a refusal to admit a proposition as a
common starting point can be a perfectly sound way of strategic maneu-
vering, but it can also derail into a fallacy, e.g., the fallacy of tu quoque. In
the tu quoque case, the reason-giving amounts to saying that the protago-
nists proposal to treat a proposition as a starting point is not acceptable
because the proposition is inconsistent with something the protagonist has
said or implied (by what he said or did) on a diﬀerent occasion.
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When discussing the soundness conditions that make it possible to
decide whether or not an antagonist maneuvers in an admissible way
when refusing to admit a proposition as a starting point because of a
proclaimed inconsistency between the proposed proposition and the
protagonists (verbal or non-verbal) behavior on a different occasion,
we observe that these soundness conditions hinge on three points: (1)
how is inconsistency to be deﬁned so that it is possible to determine
whether two propositions are logically or pragmatically inconsistent (a
point of deﬁnition), (2) how can an accusation by the antagonist be
incorporated that pertains to an inconsistency between the proposition
presently proposed as a starting point and something that was earlier
done (a matter of scope), and (3) what is in practice to be understood
by on a diﬀerent occasion, so that it can be determined in a speciﬁc
case whether pointing at an inconsistency makes sense from a dialecti-
cal perspective (a quasi-empirical issue).
7. CONCLUSION
By outlining a theoretical perspective on argumentative discourse that
integrates rhetorical insight in a pragma-dialectical framework, we
have developed an extended version of the pragma-dialectical theory
of argumentation. This extended theory makes it possible to take the
strategic design of the discourse into consideration in the analysis so
that the reconstruction of argumentative discourse can be further re-
ﬁned and better accounted for. Because the strategic function of argu-
mentative moves can now be taken into account, the extended theory
also allows for a more accurate and realistic treatment of the fallacies
in the evaluation of argumentative discourse that explains their poten-
tial persuasiveness as well as their treacherous character. In this way a
new perspective for the study of argumentation is created that over-
comes the traditional division between the dialectical approach and the
rhetorical approach to argumentative discourse through enabling an
integrated approach in which both dialectical and rhetorical insight are
systematically taking into account.
NOTES
1 We realize that rhetoric is often deﬁned in a more encompassing way, but the argumenta-
tive aspect our deﬁnition concentrates upon is always included and our deﬁnition leaves
room for broader deﬁnitions.
2 Note that we do not include rhetoric, as such, in dialectic but use insight from rhetoric in
a dialectical analysis. Our procedure of embedding rhetorical insight in a dialectical analysis
is not motivated ideologically but methodologically: our primary interest is the analysis of
critical argumentative exchanges.
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